James Longstreet's Unfiltered Opinions about Battles and Generals in 1862

James Longstreet was a prolific chronicler of his experience in the American Civil War. He wrote on the topic extensively, from articles in Century Magazine to his own well-known memoir, From Manassas to Appomattox. Thus, many of Longstreet’s postwar thoughts on the events he participated in and the soldiers he led and fought alongside are well-known.

During my research, I stumbled upon an article from the Washington Post in 1893. Newspaper correspondent Leslie J. Perry accompanied Longstreet and other Civil War veterans to the Antietam battlefield, where the old soldiers traveled “to definitely settle the positions of some of the general’s troops during the battle of September 17, 1862.” Perry claimed Longstreet’s mind was still strong in his 73rd year, but his right arm hung limply and useless from the general’s shoulder due to his wound at the Battle of the Wilderness and he had to use a “speaking tube” to hear the conversations around him.

Perry had the privilege to hear Longstreet talk “unreservedly” about many topics related to the war. Perry recognized the value of Longstreet’s words and thankfully for posterity wrote them down. Fortunately, too, Longstreet did not mind them being printed.

The article is quite long, and Perry queried Longstreet’s opinion on topics ranging from battles to leaders to the Confederate prosecution of the war. Since most of my interest is in 1862, I have edited out sections not relevant to that topic. Below are the excerpts of Perry’s conversation with Longstreet related to Antietam, Robert E. Lee, George B. McClellan, Jefferson Davis, Second Manassas, “Stonewall” Jackson, and more.

Note: I have used ellipses to indicate where I skipped transcribing sections of the article to keep the post relevant to 1862 topics.

A postwar image of James Longstreet.

“I do not think much can be expected of them": John Reynolds and the Pennsylvania Militia in the Maryland Campaign

On the morning of September 17, 1862, two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve division anxiously gripped their muskets and rifles behind the northern fence of D. R. Miller’s cornfield. Hordes of panicked Union soldiers passed through their ranks. Confederate flags bobbed above the battle smoke, heading their way. The Rebel yell amplified. Suddenly, these Pennsylvanians, with their backs to their home state, found themselves in the middle of America’s bloodiest single day. 

“I tell you the old cannon balls flew around my head worse than the devil and the musket balls went zip zip around my ears,” wrote Private Sylvester Hower. “I thought they would take me, but they all missed me.”(1) Many Confederate shots found their marks in the Pennsylvanians. By the campaign’s end, the division lost 965 between South Mountain and Antietam.

Even before those battles, the division suffered one of its greatest losses during the campaign: its commander, Brigadier General John Reynolds. The Confederate movement into Pennsylvania in early September 1862 sparked widespread fear among Pennsylvanians that their state would be the next to “welcome” the heels of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. “Our homes were threatened—the horrors of desolating war seemed likely to be brought to our very doors,” said Lewis Richards.(2) To protect his state and its people, Governor Andrew Curtin called for the state’s men to enroll in local militia outfits and to rendezvous at Harrisburg before being sent to the Maryland-Pennsylvania border to repel the invader.

Curtin continually alerted the authorities in Washington about the information his ring of spies and scouts gathered. He hoped to get something in exchange for his state’s dedication to the Federal war effort: veteran soldiers from the Army of the Potomac to come to the state’s aid. President Abraham Lincoln refused. Curtin and other prominent Pennsylvanians settled for a consolation prize: a competent officer–a Pennsylvanian–to lead the Keystone State’s defense. On September 12, 1862, Curtin got his wish. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck ordered Reynolds to report to Harrisburg. Despite objections from army commander George B. McClellan and Reynolds’ corps commander Joseph Hooker, they did not defy Halleck’s decision and Curtin’s panic. Reynolds would go.

John F. Reynolds

Two Presidents Attempt to Take the Field in September 1862

Both presidents liked to keep their fingers on the pulse of the war. The pulse that Lincoln felt was the electrical current of the telegraph. Abraham Lincoln spent many hours in the War Department’s telegraph office reading and replying to dispatches from the front. Jefferson Davis, too, played a hands-on role with his generals in orchestrating the Confederate war effort.

Despite the advances in technology that allowed Lincoln and Davis to dictate war strategy from Washington and Richmond, respectively, both commanders-in-chief often sought to get closer to the war in person.

Davis took a special train from Richmond to Manassas Junction on July 21, 1861, to satiate his appetite for news from the front and to confer with his generals. Lincoln debouched from Washington for the front multiple times in 1862. In May 1862, he helped lead the taking of Norfolk, Virginia. Two months later, following the Federal defeat in the Seven Days Campaign, Lincoln traveled to Harrison’s Landing to visit with the Army of the Potomac and its commanding general, George McClellan. When the stakes were high, both presidents wanted to be in the field with their armies.

The stakes of the Civil War were perhaps never higher than in September 1862. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had just won a victory approximately 25 miles from Washington, DC, at Second Manassas. Spurred by this victory, Lee turned his army north toward Maryland. The Old Line State had long been targeted by the Confederate government as a prospect for a new star to be added to the fledgling nation’s flag. Once he learned that Lee’s army was in Maryland, Davis made preparations to join his soldiers and rally the state to the Confederate cause.

Initially, Lee asked for the services of former Maryland governor Enoch Louis Lowe to muster Maryland’s support. After the war, General James Longstreet claimed Lee also gave “deliberate and urgent advice to President Davis to join him and be prepared to make a proposal for peace and independence from the head of a conquering army.”^[1] None of Lee’s contemporary correspondence to Davis mentions bringing the President himself north of the Potomac, only Lowe.^[2] Regardless, the message reached Lowe, likely passed on by Davis. Lowe said, “I left Richmond and pressed forward towards the army with all the speed which the most imperfect means of transportation could afford.”^[3] Unable to forego the opportunity of being at the front at such an important time in the war, Davis accompanied Lowe.

Davis and Lowe departed Richmond on Sunday, September 7. “That he should go off, therefore, on the holy Sabbath, implies that something had occurred since Friday, calling for his immediate personal attention in another quarter,” commented a Confederate correspondent. Davis must have known about the Army of Northern Virginia’s advance into Maryland, the newspaperman reasoned, and left “that he should be present while the organization of the new State government of Maryland was going on.”^[4]

The two politicians boarded a “special train” for the mission.^[5] At Rapidan Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Davis wrote a dispatch to Lee “informing me of your intention to come on to Leesburg,” Lee wrote in reply.^[6] After scribbling out the note to his general, Davis, Lowe, and their aides crossed the Rapidan River on horseback, as the railroad bridge spanning the river was inoperable.^[7] They may have taken a train from the Rapidan to the banks of the Rappahannock River, but no further than that due to that river’s bridge also being destroyed. Continuing on horseback, Davis and Lowe reached Warrenton either on September 7 or 8. Their stay in the Fauquier County seat did not last long.

It is unclear why Davis did not proceed any closer to Maryland. His health may have plagued him, as evidenced by another dispatch from Lee, in which the general regretted “that you should have exposed yourself while indisposed, to the fatigue of travel…”^[8] Davis may also have realized that continuing onto Maryland following in the path of the Army of Northern Virginia was not safe. Lee even sent one of his staff officers, Major Walter Taylor, to meet Davis and “explain to you the difficulties and dangers of the journey, which I cannot recommend you to undertake.”^[9] Taylor arrived in Warrenton after Davis had already departed, and by the time the president received Lee’s warning, he was already back in Richmond. If safety was the reason for Davis turning back, he reached that conclusion on his own.

Lowe continued his journey to Winchester. Davis returned to Richmond on September 8. A newspaper correspondent caught a glimpse of Davis at Gordonsville during the president’s return trip. In “his plain blue homespun, [Davis] took a seat, almost unnoticed, in the humble shed. Though he was soon recognized, respectfully saluted by some, and regarded with interest by all, nothing in his manner, nor in that of a crowd, indicated the presence of a high official.”^[10] 

The exact nature of Davis’ “flying trip to Warrenton” and what he hoped to accomplish is unclear.^[11] James Longstreet claimed after the war, “it had been arranged that the Southern President should join the troops [in Maryland], and from the head of his victorious army call for recognition.”^[12] The Richmond-embedded correspondent of the Charleston Mercury speculated Davis “made the trip merely for recreation and to have a quiet talk with the Governor [Lowe].”^[13] Whatever his purpose, Davis never fulfilled it. Soon, Lee’s army likewise tumbled southward out of Maryland following the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

President Abraham Lincoln likewise considered leaving the safety of his capital and accompanying his army into Maryland. Whereas Davis looked for victory and independence, Lincoln hoped for a victory to preserve the Union and provide him a reason to announce the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Though Davis’ aborted journey may have been fueled by a desire to rally support for the Confederacy from a position of strength, Lincoln’s likely stemmed from wanting to keep an eye on the Army of the Potomac and its commanding general, George B. McClellan.

In early September, Lincoln reluctantly turned to McClellan to save Washington and liberate Maryland from Lee’s army. Lincoln told one of his aides that McClellan “can’t fight himself,” though “he excels in making others ready to fight.”^[14] This opinion had been forming in Lincoln’s mind for some time.

After spending days organizing the Army of the Potomac for its campaign into Maryland against the Confederate army, McClellan departed the capital and took the field. Lincoln was impressed by the general’s ability to restore the army, but he still held reservations. On September 8, the day after McClellan’s departure, Lincoln told Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, “I can never feel confident he will do anything effectual.”^[15]

The president closely followed the army’s progress in Maryland. Lincoln, as he was want to believe about McClellan, moved too slowly. McClellan “can’t go ahead–he can’t strike a blow,” the president fumed on September 12, though it seems clear he had been thinking this way before that rant.^[16]

Aware of the stakes, Lincoln considered personally taking the field to prod the army and its commander along. He polled both General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and commander of the Washington defenses General Nathaniel Banks about the safety of doing so. Both replied to the president on September 12.

Halleck succinctly told Lincoln “no.” “Considering the consequences which might result, I respectfully advise against your going beyond the lines of Washington.”^[17]

Banks elaborated on why Lincoln should remain in Washington. “The enemy is undoubtedly in force at Leesburg, and from the mountains via Leesburg to Frederick constitutes their base of operations,” he began. “Their cavalry is likely to cross the [Potomac] River, at any, time in the rear of our troops, and a crossing by cavalry any-where this side [of] the Monocacy would intersect the line of travel proposed by you.” Thus, Banks concluded, “It seems to me that the danger is too great, of such an incursion to allow any one to move upon that line with safety.” Instead of the President leaving Washington, Banks suggested that McClellan be recalled to Rockville to meet him. Stating his point once more, Banks ended his word of caution to Lincoln: “I doubt even if a journey, that may extend to evening, can be undertaken with entire safety to that point [Rockville].”^[18]

Ultimately, Lincoln stayed behind the defenses of Washington and monitored the army’s progress from afar. No meeting with McClellan took place at Rockville. Had Lincoln proposed it, the general might have had to decline doing so. On September 12, his army reached Frederick, Maryland, on the tail of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.

Neither president was able to take the field with their respective armies in Maryland. Both thought their presence would increase the chances of success for their campaigns. The stakes in Maryland were high in September 1862, and both Davis and Lincoln wanted to play the role of commander-in-chief in person.

---

^[1] Longstreet, Manassas to Appomtattox, 204.

^[2] See Lee to Davis, September 4, 1862, and Lee to Davis, September 7, 1862, in Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Mandarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee, 294, 298.

^[3] “Maryland: Her Sympathies and Situation,” Richmond Dispatch, October 1, 1862.

^[4] “Letter from Richmond,” Memphis Daily Appeal, September 15, 1862.

^[5] Diary of Captain Henry A. Chambers, 57.

^[6] Lee to Davis, September 9, 1862, in Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Mandarin, eds., The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee, 303. Davis’ letter to Lee of September 7 has not been located.

^[7] See Lee to Davis, September 5, 1862, in Wartime Papers, 295, for information from Lee indicating that the bridge carrying the railroad over the Rapidan River was not yet rebuilt.

^[8] Lee to Davis, September 13, 1862, in Wartime Papers, 306.

^[9] Lee to Davis, September 9, 1862, in Wartime Papers, 303.

^[10] “Our Army Correspondence,” Richmond Dispatch, September 20, 1862.

^[11] “Returned,” Richmond Enquirer, September 9, 1862.

^[12] Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, 285.

^[13] “The News from Richmond,” Charleston Mercury, September 12, 1862.

^[14] Burlingame and Ettlinger, eds., Hay Diary, 38.

^[15] Beale, ed., Welles Diary, vol. 1, 116.

^[16] Ibid., 124.

^[17] Henry Halleck to Abraham Lincoln, September 12, 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

^[18] Nathaniel Banks to Abraham Lincoln, September 12, 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress.

Book Review: The Cornfield, Antietam's Bloody Turning Point, by David A. Welker

Alongside Spotsylvania’s Bloody Angle and Shiloh’s Hornet’s Nest, the fighting in David Miller’s Cornfield on the Antietam battlefield ranks as one of the toughest Civil War landscapes to make any sense of. It should then come as no surprise that it has taken over 150 years since the Battle of Antietam for a micro tactical work detailing the Miller’s Cornfield fighting to be published.

David Welker’s The Cornfield seeks to make sense of the back-and-forth actions that swept across the Miller farm on September 17, 1862, and stake its importance in shaping the outcome of the Battle of Antietam. The book briefly recounts the events of the Maryland Campaign leading up to the Battle of Antietam before giving the Cornfield action of September 16 and 17, 1862 a detailed tactical treatment. Despite the depth of the fighting which the book delves into, Welker brings the intense combat and tragedy of the Cornfield to a personal level by interspersing the text with various human interest stories.

Aside from utilizing the usual suspect of sources to craft his tactical narrative, such as the Official Records, Welker made good use of Joseph Hooker’s military papers and some of the thousands of letters that veterans wrote to Antietam’s “Historical Expert” Ezra Carman and the Antietam Battlefield Board.

Tour Photos from McClellan's Observation Post and the Pry Ridge

     The more I study the Battle of Antietam, I realize that the battlefield does not end where the National Park Service boundary does. Going even further, the battlefield is not almost entirely on the west side of Antietam Creek. With the exception of the action at Burnside Bridge, the creek is usually seen as a boundary of the battlefield. Instead, the creek actually splits the battlefield. There were plenty of events that transpired on the east side of the creek that influenced how the battle played out and many Union forces, mostly artillery, east of the Antietam that had an impactful role in the battle.
     Thankfully, over the past few years, I have had the opportunity of visiting battlefield sites that are privately owned. Specifically, both last winter and now this one, I have been able to walk the positions of the Federal artillery east of the Antietam. Last winter's hike prompted the Guns of Position series. Last weekend, thanks to fellow Battlefield Guides Tom Clemens and Joe Stahl, I was able to walk the Union artillery positions north of the Boonsboro Pike. I will refer you to the Guns of Position series for my takeaways from last year. For this hike, I wanted to share some of the photos I took from the various spots I visited. Enjoy!

McClellan's Observation Post

"The Rebels Would Eat Me Up": Attempting to Read Joseph Hooker's Mind on September 16

   

     George B. McClellan's movement of Joseph Hooker's First Corps across Antietam Creek on the afternoon of September 16 is a fascinating move to me, perhaps the most fascinating of the entire Maryland Campaign. Hooker's corps of roughly 9,000 men sent across the creek alone to face the whole Army of Northern Virginia is a gutsy decision.
     Hooker himself expressed some displeasure with his situation to McClellan in person. "If re-enforcements [sic] were not forwarded promptly, or if another attack was not made on the enemy's right, the rebels would eat me up," wrote Hooker. Clearly, Hooker was nervous about his and his corps' situation on September 16. Despite that, he attacked the enemy in his front the next morning with the Federal Twelfth Corps backing him up.

McClellan's Memorial Day Visit to Antietam

This article is reposted from the Emerging Civil War blog.

The Private Soldier Monument was dedicated in 1880 and sits at the center of Antietam National Cemetery

“Only once a year, the comrades of the Grand Army march in sad procession to place flowers on the graves of those who died, side by side with the living, in defence of their country and their homes.  This is the only public exhibition of the veterans of the Grand Army.”  So wrote the Boston Herald‘s editor in 1885, twenty years after the Civil War’s conclusion. 

Sharpsburg, Maryland’s citizens greeted Memorial Day every year with reverence. Every day, the graves of 4,776 Union soldiers looked down on their quiet town.  The stories of what they experienced on Wednesday, September 17, 1862, could never be silenced or forgotten. Memorial Day was, by then, a large American commemoration, something the press covered widely.  Veterans across the country gathered in a spirit of remembrance for their dead comrades.

Civilians gathered each Memorial Day inside the stone walls of Antietam National Cemetery to pay their respects.  The keynote speaker for the 1885 ceremony drew great attention and brought throngs of people to the burying ground in Sharpsburg.

McClellan's Guns of Position: Part 1

     When George McClellan reached the eastern banks of the Antietam Creek on the afternoon of September 15, 1862, one of his first orders was issued in person to his Chief of Artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt. He told Hunt near sundown "to select places for our guns of position."(1) These guns had a large role to play in the upcoming fight and in McClellan's battle plan.
     A few months ago, I had the pleasure of being able to walk the ground where many of these guns were positioned on September 17 on a ridge owned at the time of the battle by the Ecker family. The wartime Ecker house still stands. This prominent ridge, what I will refer to as the Ecker Ridge, stands prominently along Antietam Creek's east bank and has a commanding view of much of the Antietam battlefield. It is easy to see why it was prized by McClellan and Hunt and why the guns posted there were so effective.
     Since it was such a rare treat to visit, I took plenty of pictures, trying to capture the Federal artillerists' views as best as I could. But before posting those, in what will be Part 4 of this series, I first wanted to take a closer look at these guns of position.

Most of the guns of position can be seen overlooking Antietam Creek on the Ecker Farm Ridge in this map of the Antietam Battlefield Board.